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Abstract: Data as a Service (DaaS) is the next emerging technology in cloud
computing research. Small clouds operating as a group may exploit the DaaS
efficiently to perform the substantial amount of work. In this paper, an auction
framework is studied and evaluated when the small clouds are strategic in nature.
We present the system model and formal definition of the problem and its
experimental evaluation. Several auction DaaS-based mechanisms are proposed
and their correctness and computational complexity is analyzed. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first and realistic attempt to study the DaaS in a strategic
setting. We have evaluated the proposed approach under various simulation
scenarios to judge on its usefulness and efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Taking a specialist’s substantial infrastructure instead of creating your own individual
set up, has been the key for cloud computing success. In the last decade there has been
a significant research to deal with the allocation of resources in cloud computing Feng
and Buyya (2016), Terzo et al (2013), Zhang et al (2016), Bandyopadhyay et al (2016),
Bandyopadhyay et al (2017). Several companies (such as Amazon EC2, Microsoft Azure
etc.) have come up with technologies to support the key viewpoint of cloud computing.
Being the industry standard, cloud computing brings new challenges as well Bouchareb
et al (2016). One of such challenges is to acquire data on the fly for some business specific
queries, leading to the Data-as-a-Service model.
Two broad solutions could be provided:
• Access the data already web-crawled by the big giants (Google, Microsoft, etc.) by
their enormous infrastructure but at a high price.
• Some Small to Medium size Enterprises (SMEs) may join hand in hand and collect
the data for future use and thereby serving themselves independently several times.
In this paper, this later viewpoint is addressed and an auction framework is proposed.a
Currently, there are many existing small clouds (representing SMEs) and some of the clouds
(henceforth we will use micro-clouds) may collaborate and form a bigger clouds. This
collaboration will help collecting a substantial amount of data. Whenever a query is made
to any micro-cloud, then two cases may occur:
• Either the data is available with the bigger cloud where it belongs.
• Or the data may be available within some of the other bigger clouds.
If the data is available within the bigger cloud, there is an infrastructural cost it has to pay
to access the data. If it is outside the bigger cloud, we run an auction to set the price.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review
of the previous works and then find out the research gap that motivates the need for the
evaluation of cloud data-as-a-service business models. Section 3 proposes the system model
and problem formulation. Several solution concepts and definitions are introduced in Section
4. In Section 5 we have discussed the proposed mechanism. Section 6 discuss some analytics
of the proposed algorithm. In Section 7 we have discussed the simulation results. We present
a summary of our work and highlight some future directions in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) is coming up as an alternative school of thoughts in cloud
computing where data are obtainable as a service through network Terzo et al (2013),
Magoules et al (2012), Oliveira et al (2015), Sugawara (2017). In Terzo et al (2013) a
aThe work done in this paper is an extension of the preliminary version of the paper Bandyopadhyay et al (2018)
appeared in EIDWT 2018.
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DaaS architecture is presented for data discovery, storing and moving data, and processing
of the data with the consideration of big data as a service. A pricing scheme for a query
processing in DaaS platform is addressed in Oliveira et al (2015). No auction based work
is proposed, to the best of our knowledge, in DaaS environment. In this paper an auction
framework is discussed when DaaS is in operation. However in literature several incentive
schemes (mostly in monetary aspects) have been proposed in Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) framework for stimulating the service providers to provide the best possible services
to the users. Nielsen (1970) proposes pricing technique for allocating computing resources.
Sutherland (1968) proposes a game theoretic auction model approach (based on auction
theory) for allocating the processor time in a single computer. An auction mechanism
proposed by Amazon is called spot marketing which is prevailing in the current cloud
computing market.
In Mihailescu and Teo (2009) a strategy-proof mechanism for the allocation of multiple
resources to a buyer in a large scale distributed system is proposed. In Combinatorial
auctions (CA) which has been widely studied by the researchers Mashayekhy and Grosu
(2014), Milgrom (2004), Nisan et al (2007), Baranwal and Vidyarthi (2015), Fujiwara
et al (2010) allow service providers to sell bundle of items rather than individual item and
the users (buyers) to bid on any combination of items or services. Das and Grosu (2005)
proposed a combinatorial auction-based protocol for resource allocation in grids. They
considered a model where different grid providers can provide different types of computing
resources. The third party auctioneer collects this information about the resources and runs
a combinatorial auction-based allocation mechanism where users participate by requesting
bundles of resources. However, when multiple buyers and multiple sellers are present in the
market a double auction mechanism is visible Lehmann et al (2002), Archer et al (2003),
Mu’alem and Nisan (2008). The double auction mechanism is extended into the online
double auction environment in Mu’alem and Nisan (2008), Ibrahim et al (2011), Bartal et al
(2003), Zhang et al (2016). In Zhou et al (2017) an efficient online auction mechanism was
proposed where cloud user gives their bids for future cloud resources to execute its job.
In the model so far in IaaS participating agents were individual in nature. However in our
DaaS participating agents may be largely the individual groups. So, the earlier models may
not be directly applicable.
3 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this paper, we have a set of Big Cloud(s) (BCs) depicted asC = {C1, . . . , Cn}. Each of
Ci (a cluster) consisting of some micro clouds. Depending on the number of micro clouds
in each Ci, two cases are possible for any pair of (Ci, Cj):
1. | Ci |=| Cj |
2. | Ci |6=| Cj |
We can generalize the notation and can write Ci = {mCi1, mCi2, . . . , mCiki} where ki ∈{1, 2, . . . ,m} and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. This fact is depicted in Figure.1. Each micro cloud
mCij ∈ Ci joins Ci with some collection of data and that micro-cloud may be referred at
any point of time by the user who needs service. To promote the participation in this model
it is assumed that when a mCij joins a cloud Ci, it needs only its data and no registration
fees.
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Figure 1: Different micro-cloud forming the
cluster
The data is maintained by the existing infrastructure ofCi. However when a query is made,
in future, mCij is charged a fixed amount if the data is available inside that Ci as the
infrastructure cost. Otherwise, to get the data an auction is run with the other clouds Cj ′s,
where the data are available.
So, the payment of mCij can be formulated as p
i
j=x
i
j · σij+x¯ij · σ¯ij where xij is the indicator
function defined as :
xij =
{
1, if data is inside mCij
0, otherwise
(1)
and
x¯ij =
{
1, if data is not inside mCij
0, otherwise
(2)
A micro cloud may earn some money also when an auction is run. σij is the fixed amount
charged and σ¯ij is the payment made by mC
i
j when the data is found outside of the Ci
wheremCij ∈ Ci. Here sealed bid auction is considered and eachCi ∈ C will have a private
valuation vi known only to them.
If in the auction cloud Ci wins, in this case ai is taken as the money won by cloud Ci.
then the amount of money mCij ∈ Ci earns is: p¯ij = yij · ( 12ai) + y¯ij · ( 12aiwij). Here, like
the previous case, yij and y¯
i
j are the indicator functions defined as:
yij =
{
1, if mCij is the contributor in Ci
0, otherwise
(3)
and
y¯ij =
{
1, if mCij is not the contributor in Ci
0, otherwise
(4)
If, mCij is the contributor in Ci then it is taken that
1
2a
i will be given to mCij and
1
2a
i will
be divided based on the weight wij corresponding to mC
i
j . It is not a bad idea to give the
contributor the half of the amount won, which will definitely boost the contributor and give
him the luxury of providing quality services.
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It is assumed that each mCij is associated with a weight. When a new mC
i
j joins the cloud
Ci, then a small weight wij is assigned to it and its score increases by 1 if its data is invoked
by other cloud later. Thereby the remaining amount is divided by a proportional share
mechanism. So, the total payment made by an mCij over all transactions can be defined as
pˆij =
kˆ1∑
i=1
pij −
kˆ2∑
i=1
p¯ij (5)
where kˆ1 is the number of transactions for which mCij is charged some money and kˆ2 is
the number of transactions where it earned some money.
4 Several solution concepts and definitions
In this section, the brief overview of the substantially used solution concepts and several
definitions in the rest of the paper, is provided.
4.1 Mechanism design
Mechanism design−’The Science of rule making’− is an elegant and well developed sub area
of game theory Nisan et al (2007), Roughgarden (October 2013a). It deals with designing
the rules of the systems with strategic participants (or players) Belleili-Souici (2017) that
have their own interest, may not be same as that of the mechanism designer’s. By strategic
we mean that, the participants can game the system in order to gain. The bottom line is, when
you are designing the system like "a tournament" or like "an auction" or like "a computer
networks" that have strategic participants, it is the rules of the system that matters. Talking
in terms of application areas, the field of mechanism design has widespread application
domains but not limited to spectrum auctions Nisan et al (2007), kidney exchange Nisan
et al (2007), Roughgarden (October 2013b), matching residents to the hospitals Nisan et al
(2007), Gale and Shapley (2013), etc.
4.2 Prisoner’s dilemma
This is one of the well known and extensively studied problems that is modeled using game
theory Nisan et al (2007). Two individualsP1 andP2 are arrested for allegedly committing a
crime and are placed in separate prison cells. Each prisoner is interrogated in their respective
prison cell independently and they have two possible choices (or strategies) confess (C) or
not confess (NC). If both the prisoners follow the strategy namely NC, then it is impossible
for the interrogating officer to prove charges against the prisoners. The consequence to
which is, the two prisoners will be imprisoned for the short period of time say for 3 years.
On the other hand, if only one of the two prisoners follow the strategy namely C, then in
that case his imprisonment time will be reduced from 3 years to 1 year, and will be used as a
witness against the other prisoner, who in term will be imprisoned for 8 years. Finally, if both
of them follow the strategy namely C, then they both will be incentivized for cooperating
with the interrogating officers and will be imprisoned for 5 years each instead of 8 years.
The cost matrix below shows the cost incurred for these four outcomes.
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P1
P2
NC
NC C
C (−5,−5)
(−3,−3) (−8,−1)
(−1,−8)
The left component of any entry represents the cost incurred by P1 for that outcome and
right component of the entry represents the cost incurred for P2. The only stable solution
or Nash equilibrium is the entry (−5,−5), rest other three entries are unstable. By unstable
we mean that, at least one of the two prisoners can increase the incurred cost by unilateral
deviation.
4.3 Useful Definitions
Truthful: It means that, no participating agent can gain by misreporting their private
information(s). More formally, if the utility relation ui ≥ u′i holds keeping in mind that ui
is the utility of agent i when he is reporting his true type vi and u′i is the utility of that agent
when he is reporting any other type v′i 6= vi.
Individual rationality (IR): By IR we mean that, by taking part into the auction, the
agents receive a non-negative utility. Formally, it can be said that ui = pi − vi ≥ 0.
Budget balance (BB): By BB we mean that, the sum of all the monetary transfers between
the participating agents is less than or equal to zero.
Nash equilibrium (NE): A strategy vector s ∈ S is said to be a Nash equilibrium if for all
players i and each alternate s′i ∈ Si, we have that ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i). More formally,
no player can improve his/her payoff by unilateral deviation.
5 Proposed Mechanism
In this section we propose an auction based DaaS algorithm for the framework discussed
in the earlier sections. The algorithm is termed as Auction Based DaaS (ABDaaS). The
ABDaaS algorithm has five main components:
• Main_Routine
• Identify
• Run_Auction
• Set_Buyer_Price
• Set_Seller_Price
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Algorithm 1 Main_Routine
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: Query is made for mCij ∈ Ci
3: if data is in Ci then
/* Update the payment of mCij */
4: mCij · p←mCij · p + FC
/* FC is some fixed cost to maintain infrastructure */
5: else
/* Search for the other clouds for data */
6: i = i
7: S ← Identify (C \ Ci)
8: S′, v′, mC, i′ ← Run_Auction (S)
/* S′→ which cloud will provide the data
v′ → Second price
mC → which micro-cloud inside S′ contributed
i′→ The index of S′ */
9: Set_Buyer_Price (mCij , v
′)
10: Set_Seller_Price (S′, v′, mC, i′)
11: end if
12: end for
13: end
If the data is available within the BC where the micro-cloud belongs, a fixed payment is
made by the micro-cloud. In the else part auction is run. First Identify routine (see Alg.
2) searches for the cloud agents who can provide the data and then an auction is run with
Run_Auction (see Alg. 3) based on the framework of Vickrey auction Vickrey (1961)
that is cast into reverse auction setting in our problem. The Set_Buyer_Price and set
the payment of the buyers and in the Set_Seller_Price, the payment of themCij ∈ Ci
who contributes and the payment of all other micro-clouds in the set Ci −mCij are made.
Algorithm 2 Identify (S¯)
1: S ← φ
2: for i = 1 to |S¯| do
3: if data available to S¯i then
4: S ← S ∪ {S¯i}
5: end if
6: end for
7: return S
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Algorithm 3 Run_Auction (S)
1: v← φ
/* Collection of Bids */
2: for i = 1 to |S| do
3: vi ← bid(Si)
4: v ← v ∪ {vi}
5: end for
/* Selecting Winner */
6: i = argminj:vj∈v vj
7: i′ = i . Remember the index of the cloud selected
8: S′ ← Si
9: S = S − Si
/* Selecting the second highest bidder for payment */
10: for i = 1 to |S| do
11: vi ← bid(Si) /* storing all bids except the winner in vi */
12: v ← v ∪ {vi}
13: end for
/* Selecting the second highest bidder */
14: i = argminj:vj∈v vj
15: v′ = vi
16: mC ← extract (S′) . Which micro cloud served the data
17: return (S′, v′, mC, i′)
Algorithm 4 Set_Buyer_Price (mCij , v′)
1: mCij · p = mCij · p+ v′
Algorithm 5 Set_Seller_Price (S′, v′, mC, i′)
1: for j = 1 to |S′| do
2: if mC = mCj then
3: mCi
′
j · p¯ = mCi
′
j · p¯ + 12v′
/* p¯ is the payment earned and p is the payment spend */
4: mCi
′
j · p¯ + 12v′ · 1|S′|−1 (equal share)
5: or mCi
′
j · p¯ = mCi
′
j · p¯ + v
′
2 ·
mCi
′
j ·wi
′
j∑
mCi
′
j
∈S′−mC mC
i′
j ·wi
′
j
(proportional share)
6: end if
7: end for
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6 Analytics of the proposed method
6.1 Time Complexity
In each round, time complexity can be measured as follows: the algorithm Identify
will take O(n) time. The Run_Auction will take O(nlogn) time as the simplest
implementation of argmin() may be a sorting. For pricing schemes two subroutines are
used : 1) Set_Buyers_Price and 2) Set_Seller_price. Set_Buyers_Price
will take O(1) time, where as Set_Seller_price will take O(m) time where m < n.
So, the average time complexity is O(nlogn).
6.2 Correctness of the proposed algorithm
For correctness of the algorithm we have to give emphasis on the main aspect of the proposed
algorithm i.e pricing. It is to be shown that, when a cloud agent i is securing information,
its payment being updated properly. Think all micro-clouds in a two dimensional array;
where each row corresponds to a micro-cloud mCi and the column corresponds to the two
attributes mCi · p and mCi · p¯ along with others.
When a query is made, mCi · p and mCi · p¯ either incremented by 0 or FC or some
quantity ∆ (where, ∆ = 12v
′ · 1|S′|−1 or v
′
2 ·
mCi
′
j ·wi
′
j∑
mCi
′
j
∈S′−mC mC
i′
j ·wi
′
j
) as can be observed
from the Main_Routine or from Set_Buyer_Price and Set_Seller_price.
• In the Main_Routine:
mCi · p = mCi · p+ FC, /*an increment*/
or mCi · p = mCi · p+ 0, /*not the corresponding cloud.*/
• In the Set_Buyers_Price
mCi · p = mCi · p+ v′, /*an increment by the auction price*/
or mCi · p = mCi · p+ 0, /*if not the corresponding cloud*/
• In the Set_Seller_price
mCi · p¯ = mCi · p¯+ 12v′, /*an increment if the micro-cloud is the main contributor
*/
or mCi · p¯ = mCi · p¯+ ∆, /*if the micro-cloud is not the main contributor but
belongs to Ci */
or mCi · p¯ = mCi · p¯+ 0 . /* if the micro-clouds does not belong to Ci. */
This argument shows that the payment of each micro-cloud is updated when the
corresponding micro-cloud is involved in the transaction.
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Lemma 1: Fixed payment doesn’t affect the auction.
The payment of any micro-cloud mCij at any round t ∈ T is given by pij = xij · σij +
x¯ij · σ¯ij . The if part of ABDaaS (Main_Routine) is responsible for xij · σij and else part
contributes x¯ij · σ¯ij and the indicator function depicts the fact that at any round either xij · σij
will be resulted or x¯ij · σ¯ij will be resulted. This confirms that fixed payment does not affect
the auction. 
Theorem 2: Auction proposed in ABDaaS is Truthful
By truthful it is meant that in the auction cloud agents cannot gain by manipulation. Here
the utility for any cloud agent i is defined as:
ui =
{
pi − vi, reverse auction settings.
0, otherwise.
(6)
where pi is the payment made to the seller who wins and vi is his original valuation.
Now, we observe that:
Case 1: If a seller wins and gives a valuation less, he still wins and utility uˆi = ui. If he
gives a valuation vˆi > vi, then again two cases arise: he can win or lose. In the win case,
his utility uˆi = ui and we can say no gain is there. In the losing case, uˆi = 0 < ui and
hence no gain.
Case 2: If a seller loses by reporting his true valuation. With a similar argument of Case
1, it can be proved that no gain is achieved in this case also. So by manipulation an agent
can’t gain.

6.3 Participation of the Agents in ABDaaS
Table 1 Table x.a
P NP
P 1, 1 -2, 3
NP 3, -2 -1, -1
Table 2 Table x.y
P NP
P -2, 3
NP -1, -1
Table 3 Table x.x
P NP
P 1, 1
NP 3, -2
Now we will analyze (similar in line with Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), Roughgarden
(October 10, 2016)) the behavior of the BC from a game theoretic perspective and will
show that it is better for the BCs to participate in the auction. When a BC, say Ci ∈ C
needs some data, we have to argue that any other BC, say Cj (where j 6= i) ∈ C should
also participate and gain in the future. So, we can perceive the behavior of the BCs as a
game (participate or not) played pairwise by any (Ci, Cj) pair. For any Ci ∈ C, there are
two strategies possible either participation (P ) or non-participation (NP ).
Non-participation (NP ) in the auction means enjoying other’s service locally and that
involves a positive cost 3. Participation (P ) against (NP ) is that you need to deploy an agent
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or a set of agents to bid for you which we call an overhead cost (even if he is earning some
money by participating) and denoted by −2. In (NP,NP ) case neither agent deploying
anybody and the service may have to be taken from outside thereby causing each agent
(−1,−1). For (P, P ) case both will enjoy the service locally and hence a positive payoffs
i.e. (1, 1). The whole payoff matrix is given in Table 1. Given this cost matrix, we can
observe that the only stable solution (a Nash equilibrium) in this case is (−1,−1) as in
this case, any agent deviates unilaterally will be a loser. Say for example, the row player
deviates and play P . The other player will be remaining fixed as he is deviating unilaterally.
The strategy is shown in the Table 2.
So, from (−1), he is now having (−2) that is even worse. Unilateral deviation will not
be fruitful and leads (NP,NP ) to Nash equilibrium. We can take any other strategy, say
(P, P ) = (1, 1). Suppose row player deviates. It will route us to the case (NP,P ) and the
payoff in isolation is shown in the Table 3.
We perceive that the increase in payoff is 3− 1 = 2. Unilateral deviation clinches some
amount of gain and hence (P, P ) is not an stable solution (i.e. incentive to deviates). Now
the observation so far is specified in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: In ABDaaS defection (Non-participation) is the equilibrium solution for one
round auction.
Consider any arbitrary pairs (Ci, Cj) as the two players or the agents. From Table 3, it
is observed that (P, P ) is not the equilibrium solution as at least one player may have
better payoff with unilateral deviation. In the similar line we can argue that (P,NP ) and
(NP,P ) case is also not a stable solution i.e. not reaching to the equilibrium solution.
However from Table 2 it is clear that (NP,NP ) is a stable solution as unilateral deviation
of neither player is fruitful for the agent under consideration. 
We see just now that Ci′s may not participate when the data are demanded from some
arbitraryCj ∈ C and the system (exchanging data as a service) may eventually collapse. To
have the system up and running, the agents Ci′s should participate. However, the Lemma
3 is showing that participation is not a stable solution. If we take a clinical look we can see
that in Lemma 3, we have assumed that only one time the auction will be executed. Here lies
the catch. InABDaaS we will have multiple auction rounds in sequence. Again, if we take
a deeper look at Table 1, we can conclude that the game in Table 1 resembles the famous
Prisoner’s Dilemma game and as the game in Table 1 will be played multiple rounds, we can
model the auction rounds inABDaaS with repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. First let us think
the auction repeats for k rounds which is fixed a priori. Will this k number of iterations of the
auction rounds be leading to the co-operation (participation) in the long run ? The answer
is no. That we can prove by a technique called backward induction. In forward induction
we start from the base case and move forward, while in backward induction we first make
settlement at last, then go backward till the best possible decision is made in every iteration.
Before analyzing the auction rounds in ABDaaS first the rules of the auction rounds to be
specified.
• We have a pair of cloudsCi andCj where i 6= j and they play the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game for k rounds with k > 0.
• In each round they take their decision in parlance of the payoff matrix of Table 1 and
the total payoffs they accumulate is the sum of the payoffs of all the k rounds.
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• The decision taken in the past is to be considered while taking decision at present. So
present can depend on the past.
Once this realistic model is specified, the nontrivial question is, what will happen in
this iterative version of the auction rounds a Participation or not? One may think that
Participation may emerge in this model. However if we take a bird’s- eye view, we can show
that, still Participation is not a best response. This is presented in the Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: For a finite number of auction rounds, defection (Non-participation) is the best
response of any arbitrary Ci ∈ C.
We will prove this by backward induction. With the philosophy of backward induction,
we first consider the kth round. By definition, after this round there will be no more rounds
and hence every Ci will take the fact into consideration that, it is playing the Prisoner’s
Dilemma only one time. As we know that defection is the best response for one shot
Prisoner’s Dilemma, at the last kth round, both the players (Ci and Cj) will defect. Now
come to the (k − 1)th stage i.e. one round back. Players already has seen that at kth round
players will defect by default. So, this (k − 1)th stage will appear to both the player as
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma again and hence non-participation (defection) again. We can
conclude, that if we back inductively (backward induction) till the first round defection will
emerge as the best response.

Just now we have seen that if the auction rounds run for a fixed finite number of times, by
backward induction it is proved that defection will emerge. However in our case, a-priori
we don’t know how many auction rounds will be executed. This observation will play a key
role to show that in this situation co-operation may emerge. With uncertainty in auction
rounds, probability will be involved in the model. We can assume that the auction round
stops with probability p and it continues with probability 1− p i.e. any arbitrary (Ci, Cj)
pair plays Prisoner’s Dilemma again with probability 1− p. Other modeling criteria i.e.
the total payoffs are calculated by summing up the payoffs of each individual auction
round. Here the objective of any arbitrary player (Ci) is to maximize his or her expected
payoffs. We will further analyze the randomness in auction rounds through the lens of two
most famous strategies namely:
• Grim-Trigger (GT)
• Tit-For-Tat (TFT)
Out of these two, GT is more stringent and TFT is more soft. In GT if some player defects
in ith stage, then the other player will show him the red card forever from the next round
onward, even if the other player shows a good gesture (co-operation) afterward. In TFT if
a player defects in one round the other also defects and if he co-operates again the other
player forgives his misbehave and comes back to the co-operation from the next round. For
our further discussion co-operation and participation will be used synonymously and the
same for defection and non-participation.
6.4 Analysis with GT
We start with co-operation, say Ci and Cj co-operates up to stage k − 1 as follows:
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Ci
Cj
C C
C C
. . .
. . .
C C ? ? . . .
1 2 k − 2 k − 1 k k + 1
C C ? ? . . .
When Cj sees that if Ci participates (co-operates) in (k − 1)th stage, then what should be
his decision in the next round ? whether he will co-operate or not in kth stage and there on
? First after (k − 1)th stage it is known that another round will be there and from (k + 1)th
stage randomness is inculcated in the auction rounds. We now see the (k − 1)th, kth and
(k + 1)th stage in isolation and can summarize the payoffs below:
Cj
P
NP
1
3
(1− p).1
(1− p).(−1)
(k + 1)th stage
expected payoffs
kth
stage payoffs
Figure 2: Payoff in isolation
In Figure.2 Cj’s strategy and its corresponding payoffs are provided under the
consideration that in case in (k − 1)th stage a co-operation happens, and if we think
meticulously we will see that this case is non-trivial. If Cj plays P , then its payoffs is 1 in
kth stage as i will also play P according to the GT . Likewise the case for NP i.e. when
Cj plays NP . Similarly in (k + 1)th stage the payoffs (expected) is calculated, when in
kth stage Cj plays P . The expected payoffs in (k + 1)th stage is calculated as follows:
When the game stops, the payoff is 0, otherwise the payoffs are decided from Table 1.
In any stage the auction round either stops or continues. Let us define a random variableXi
denoting the payoffs in (k + 1)th stage onwards for co-operation.
So, by definition of expectation we get the expected payoffs for co-operation.
E[Xi] =
∑
x
x.Pr{Xi = x}
= 1.(1− p) + 0.(p)
= (1− p)
Here x = 1 is the payoff associated with co-operation. Similarly, we can define the X¯i as
the random variable for the defection. So,
E[X¯i] =
∑
x
x.Pr{X¯i = x}
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= (−1).(1− p) + 0.(p)
= −(1− p)
If X is the random variable to denote the total payoffs over k rounds after ith round. We
can say X = X1 +X2 + . . .+Xk =
∑K
k=1Xk where X1 is the (i+ 1)
th round and so
on. If we take expectation both side we get
E[X] = E
[
K∑
k=1
Xk
]
=
K∑
k=1
E[Xk]
=
K∑
k=1
(1− p)
= K(1− p)
Similarly we can findE[X¯] = −K(1− p). At this stage we can formulate our final Lemma
5.
Lemma 5: When randomness is involved in auction round, participation (co-operation)
emerges.
Let us sum-up the payoffs of ith round and subsequent k uncertain rounds, both for
participation and non-participation.
For participation:
1 + k(1− p) (7)
For non-participation:
3− k(1− p) (8)
For participation to be emerges
1 + k(1− p) ≥ 3− k(1− p)
⇒ k(1− p) + k(1− p) ≥ 2
⇒ 2k(1− p) ≥ 2
⇒ k(1− p) ≥ 1 (9)
If we put p = 12 i.e. with 50% chance the auction repeats, equation 9 becomes
k(1− 1
2
) ≥ 1
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⇒ k 1
2
≥ 1
⇒ k ≥ 2
If p = 13 , k ≥ 32
If p = 23 , k ≥ 3
This k value shows that from any arbitrary ith round, if we consider randomness, very
fast the participation payoffs supersede the non-participation payoff even if the auction
round stops with high probability (p = 23 ). This proves our claim. 
7 Experimental Results
In this section, experiments have been carried out in order to measure the performance of our
proposed mechanism i.e. ABDaaS. In order to validate our results we have taken the help
of two probability distributions such as uniform distribution (UD) and normal distribution
(ND). The bid values of the clouds are generated using UD and ND. The performance of
our proposed mechanism is measured on the ground of total payment made to the clouds.
7.1 Simulation Set-up
For the simulation purpose, we have considered the number ofCi′s, are in between (50, 70)
and eachCi consists of micro clouds and the number of micro-clouds are taken in the range
(15, 50). In case of UD, the bid value of each Ci is uniformly distributed over [100, 400].
The bid value ofCi in case of ND is parameterized by the mean 250 and standard deviation
100. The unit of bid values are in $.
In our scenario, every time the auction will not be taking place for the data allocation
purpose. The auction will be taking place only when the micro cloud fails to get the required
data within the in-house cloud. In order to show the impact of data available in-house or
outside of the cloud on the total payment made by the micro-clouds, we have considered
three cases. The three cases are: 1) γ1 = .25 i.e.with probability .25 the requests are fulfilled
from outside of the in-house cloud, 2) γ2 = .50 i.e. with probability .50 the requests are
fulfilled from outside of the in-house cloud and 3) γ3 = .75 i.e. with probability .75 the
requests are fulfilled from outside of the in-house cloud. The total payment paid by all micro-
clouds to all queries made by the users is calculated and depicted in the simulation. The total
payment, on one sample run consists of the payment of fixed cost FCi and Auction costAj
to be summed up over all queries and could be given by P¯k =
(1−α)∗100∑
i=1
FCi +
α∗100∑
j=1
Aj .
Here, α is how much percentage of the total iterations is devoted to auction. We have run
the process on the same data set overK = 100 times and then we have taken the average to
calculate the final payment P and is given by P = (
K∑
k=1
P¯k)/K. The different impacts of
payment P against the number of times the data are consulted from in-house and outside.
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7.2 Result Analysis
Now for the scenario 1, when the fixed cost (FC) is 100, it can be seen in Figure. 3a and
Figure. 3b that the total payment made to the clouds in case of γ3 is more than the total
payment made to the clouds in case of γ2 is more than total payment made to the clouds in
case of γ1. It is due to the fact that, in this case, when the data are accessed from outside,
the in-house cloud i.e. when auction comes into picture the payment made to the clouds
are higher than FC.
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Figure 3: Total payment comparison when FC=100
Now for the scenario 2, when the fixed cost (FC) is 250, it can be seen in Figure. 4a
and Figure. 4b that the total payment made to the clouds in case of γ3 is better than the
total payment made to the clouds in case of γ2 and γ1. In this case, FC=250 and the data
are accessed from outside, the in-house cloud i.e. when auction comes into picture the
payment made to the clouds are higher than FC.
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Figure 4: Total payment comparison when FC=250
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Now for the scenario 3, when the fixed cost (FC) is 400, it can be seen in Figure. 5a
and Figure. 5b that the total payment made to the clouds in case of γ1 is more than the total
payment made to the clouds in case of γ2 is more than total payment made to the clouds in
case of γ3. However, in the last scenario the data are accessed from outside, the in-house
cloud i.e. when auction comes into picture the payment made to the clouds are higher than
FC.
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Figure 5: Total payment comparison when FC=400
8 Conclusion and future works
In this paper we have proposed an auction framework for Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) in cloud
computing. The DaaS model has emerged as an important model in cloud computing to
provide data on demand to the users. This model is attractive to data consumers, because it
enables the separation of data cost and of data usage from the cloud infrastructure cost. In
our proposal, how a subset of smaller clouds collaborate and exchanges information (data)
is oriented in an auction framework.
In our future work we will address the issue when a micro-cloud needs data from two
or more cloud agents. This setting will lead us to the combinatorial auction. Additionally,
we plan to evaluate the proposed auction framework under various multi-provider cloud
settings.
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